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The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the process by which Chile was able to reduce
inflation during the 1990s. During this period, inflation was gradually reduced from close to
30% per annum in 1990, to only 6% in 1997. The paper concludes that three factors were
important in helping to accomplish this reduction. First, the independent Central Bank and
its tough action early on -to convey the message that it was ready to stand behind its core
objective (to reduce inflation)- helped to shape inflationary expectations and, in the event,
led to lower wage inflation and ultimately a lower path for core inflation.  Second, the Bank’s
restrictive monetary policy, and the foreign exchange intervention policies associated with
it, resulted in a nominal exchange rate trajectory much below what would have been observed
under a PPP rule adjusted for differences in productivity. This result was reinforced by the
low credibility of the band, reflected in the effect on the observed rate of the location of the
exchange rate within the band. Third, the higher rate of growth of labor productivity, given
the wage equation, resulted in a lower rate of growth of the unit cost of labor than would
have obtained otherwise. Of these three effects, the first, that is, the enhanced credibility of
the new policy operating through the formation of inflation expectations, was found to be
the most important factor in the successful reduction of the inflation rate.
I. Introduction
Following 40 years of high and variable inflation, Chile, during the 1990s,
has made major progress in reducing inflation toward levels observed in
industrial countries. Even more remarkable is that the inflation reduction
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was achieved without the short-term costs frequently incurred in terms of
reduced output growth or a higher rate of unemployment. On the contrary,
while inflation was being reduced, growth increased and the unemployment
rate reached its lowest level in 30 years. Indeed, Chile’s economic record
over the past ten years has been outstanding.  During the 1986-1997 period,
the average GDP growth rate reached 7.6%, while the average inflation rate
fell-to 17.8%.  The unemployment rate also fell from close to 30% in late
1982, to only 5.3% during the last quarter of 1997. Furthermore, the inflation
rate (Dec.- Dec.), which had reached 27,3% in 1990, decreased throughout
the 1990s to reach 6.6% in 1996, and only 6.0% in 1997.
The foundations of Chile’s anti-inflationary program were laid during
the 1970s, when the public sector deficit was eradicated. However, it was
only in the 1990s, with the creation of an independent Central Bank, when
continuous progress was made on reducing inflation. This objective was
pursued by a newly established independent Central Bank, founded with
currency stability as one of its principal aims.
The historical record of high and variable inflation, with its negative effects
on the efficiency of resource allocation and economic growth, and the
increasingly accepted view that macroeconomic stability was a precondition
for sustained high growth, motivated the granting of institutional
independence to the Central Bank. An indicator of how widely this view was
held is the fact that, although the independence of the Central Bank had been
approved under the military government, it has also been embraced by the
center-left coalition of parties which have governed Chile during the 1990s.
Chilean inflation was an historic fact and, during the past 40 years, the record
had been clearly poor. In the 1960s, inflation averaged 21.1 percent per annum.
In the early 1970s, under the populist policies of the Allende government,
inflation accelerated, reaching an annual rate of approximately 463 percent
in August 1973, the month before Allende’s fall. Underlying the acceleration
of inflation was a consolidated non-financial public sector deficit that, by 1973,
was close to 25 percent of GDP, a deficit mainly financed by printing money.
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The military government which took power in September 1973 had
among its main objectives the elimination of the severe and pressing
macroeconomic disequilibrium which it inherited; it also took rapid action to
reduce microeconomic distortions in relative prices. To achieve this goal, it
was necessary to revise public sector size and responsibilities;  as a result of
this process, public sector participation in economic activities was heavily
curtailed.
The newly independent Central Bank, created in October 1989, began
operating in December 1989, only three months before the Presidency was
transferred from Pinochet to Aylwin, and undertook the second stage of
inflation reduction. Although the Central Bank’s main objectives were to
achieve price stability and to ensure the proper functioning of the domestic and
external payment system, the existence of a robust financial system and solid
external accounts allowed the Central Bank to concentrate on reducing
inflation.
The purpose of this paper is to study Chilean stabilization policies. In
Section 2, we will review the experience of the 1990s, when inflation was
reduced from 26% in 1990, to only 6% in 1997. In Section 3, we will analyze
the different factors behind that inflation reduction and, in Section 4, we
present our main conclusions.
II.  Stabilization Policy in the 1990s1
During the 1990s, monetary policy has been geared towards reducing
inflation with the ultimate objective of achieving price stability. The new
Central Bank Charter of 1989, which made the Central Bank institutionally
independent, created the setting for the design of monetary policy during the
90s. The charter stipulates that the main objectives of monetary policy should
1 For an analysis of  Chilean stabilization policies in the pre-1990 period see Corbo
and Fischer (1994).
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be “the stability of the currency and the normal development of the internal
and external payment systems”.
In terms of the current literature on Central Bank independence, the
Central Bank of Chile is modeled on Rogoff’s “Conservative Central Banker”
(1985)2. Chilean law gives the Central Bank independence to set its own
targets as well as to choose the instruments it deems appropriate for achieving
those targets.  Furthermore, in contrast to other independent Central Banks
created recently, the Central Bank of Chile is also responsible for the exchange
rate system and for exchange rate policy.
The Central Bank has set itself the objective of gradually reducing inflation
toward levels observed for industrial countries, while maintaining current
account deficits which will not jeopardize the stability of the external payment
system. The Central Bank has set out an upper bound for the current account
deficit of 4% of GDP, with absorption and national disposable income
measured at “normal” terms of trade levels. The meaning of the word “normal”
has not been clearly defined. But whenever the two objectives enter into
conflict, as was the case in 1996 and is the case again today, the inflation
target has been given priority.
The inflation objective for the coming year is chosen by the Central Bank
and announced to the Congress and to the country during the first fifteen
days of September of every year. At first, that objective was stated in terms
of a range for the CPI inflation rate for the period Dec-Dec of the coming
year. Then, starting in September 1994, the Central Bank moved toward
setting a point estimate for the inflation objective. Thus, the Central Bank
uses an inflation target framework to conduct its monetary and exchange
rate policy. The inflation target is the ultimate objective of policy, while an
2 In this model, the Central Bank board behaves as  minimizing  a quadratic loss
function in which the arguments of the function are the departure of the inflation rate
from its target and the departure of the current account deficit from its target (or the
unemployment rate from its target in  Rogoff’s model).  But de facto, the Central Bank
has been assigning greatest weight to the inflation term, resulting in conduct similar to
that observed for the “Conservative Central Banker” of Rogoff.
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inflation forecast, not made public, is the intermediate objective, and the
interest rate is the main instrument for achieving those objectives.
Stating the objective of monetary policy in terms of an inflation target is
increasingly becoming the policy in a number of industrial countries (New
Zealand, Canada, U.K., Sweden, Finland, Australia and Spain). However, in
a major departure from the practice followed in industrial countries, the
Chilean authorities announce a point estimate, while the industrial countries
announce a range3. This is not a trivial difference.  As monetary policy works
with a substantial lag, to pre-commit an unconditional inflation target -
independently of changes in external factors which do affect the inflation
rate-can be costly. Specifically, achieving that target could make it necessary
to implement an over-restrictive monetary policy or allow a sharp appreciation
of the currency, building distortions in relative prices or increasing output
volatility in the process.
A current account deficit target, at normal terms of trade, has been set by
the Central Bank at less than 4 percent of GDP. In practice, this target has
been expressed as a loose commitment to a competitive real exchange rate.
As the real exchange rate has appreciated during the 1990s, a conflict between
the inflation and the real exchange rate objectives has surfaced repeatedly
and, although the inflation objective has been given priority, the Central
Bank has struggled to avoid excessive real appreciation.  To this end, it has
intervened in the exchange rate market, implementing an aggressive and
costly policy of foreign reserve accumulation, accompanied by the
sterilization of the monetary effects of exchange rate accumulation.
The problem inherent to the pursuit of inflation and exchange rate targets,
simultaneously, is well known. Within the exchange rate system, as long as
the observed value of the exchange rate is well within the band, the uncovered
interest rate parity condition provides a link between the interest rate and
the exchange rate.  Specifically, as long as the exchange rate is within the
3 For a review of the international experience with inflation targeting, see Leiderman
and  Svensson (1995).
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band, any adjustment of the domestic interest rate results in a movement of
the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, for all practical purposes, exchange
rate policy has not been independent4. Moreover, conflicts with the Ministry
of Finance have arisen when an increase in domestic interest rates have caused
a sharp nominal and real exchange rate appreciation.  In those cases, it is
correctly argued that such an appreciation could lead to fewer exports and
eventually damage the long-term sustainability of the current account and
Chilean export-led growth model itself.
In practice, the Central Bank began by controlling monetary aggregates;
it then shifted to the use of the interest rate as its main instrument for achieving
the inflation target5.  Through the use of monetary policy, the Central Bank
controls the evolution of actual inflation. It occasionally appears that the
inflation forecast -used as an intermediate target- is closely related to the
gap between domestic expenditures and GDP, and it is by managing this gap
that it tries to avoid the build up of inflationary pressures which could
endanger the inflation target.  The Minister of Finance can then use supply-
side fiscal policy to increase capacity output and to reduce the rate of natural
unemployment.
Acknowledging the slowness with which the rate of change of nominal
wages and prices adjusts in a fully indexed economy, such as Chile’s, the
Central Bank defined a policy aimed at achieving a gradual reduction of
4 During the 1990s, the exchange rate system has been managed as a diagonal exchange
rate band. The central parity of the band is adjusted passively, on a daily basis, by the
difference between the domestic and international inflation of the previous month. The
width of the band was increased to 10 percent on both sides of central parity in January
1992. Up to July 1992, central parity was established in terms of the value of the US
dollar. However, since then, it has been set in terms of a basket of currencies. Moreover,
starting in November 1995, a further 2 percent per annum has been subtracted from
the central parity to accommodate an estimate for trend appreciation of the equilibrium
real exchange rate.
5 This shift is, indeed, consistent in a world of continuous financial innovation whereby
the link between the growth in monetary aggregates and inflation or the growth in
nominal income is too fragile to be the cornerstone of stabilization policy.
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inflation. When the board of the newly independent Central Bank took office
in December 1989, in the context of the expansionary macroeconomic
policies of 1989, the 12-month inflation rate (November 1988 to November
1989) was 21.1% and accelerating.  One of the first measures adopted by the
board was to introduce a sharp increase in real —CPI indexed— interest
rates on Central Bank bills.  The real interest rate on the 10-year Central
Bank bond was raised by 280 base points, from 6.9 to 9.7 percent per annum.
Simultaneously, the rate on the 90-day —CPI indexed— Central Bank bond
was raised from 6.8 to 8.7 percent per annum.  However, in a world of
increasingly integrated capital markets, the high real interest rate policy pulled
in foreign capital, which, in turn, led to an appreciation of the real exchange
rate6.  Not surprisingly, in 1990, the value of the peso appreciated up to the
lower limit of the exchange rate band. To defend the band, the Central Bank
found it necessary to intervene in the foreign exchange market, in the process,
accumulating US $ 2.43 billion of additional foreign reserves in that year
alone, an 82.3% increase in the stock of foreign reserves.  This massive
exchange rate accumulation amounts to a significant exchange rate
intervention. However, as Central Bank authorities wished to establish
credibility for their anti-inflationary stance, they accompanied the exchange
rate accumulation with an aggressive sterilization policy run simultaneously.
III. Accounting for the Reduction of Inflation in the 90s.
The newly established, independent Central Bank has achieved an
impressive record in gradually but continuously reducing inflation and in
achieving inflation levels close to the target rate. In the process, it has gained
credibility for its stabilization policy.  In turn, most likely through its impact
6 The exchange rate policy of the 1990s has been of the exchange rate band type, with
central parity adjusted on a daily basis by the past difference between domestic and
foreign inflation.  For details of the exchange rate policy see table III:1 in Corbo  and
Desormeaux  (1996).
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on the wage setting process, the increased credibility of its policies has
reduced the short-term costs of gradual inflation reduction.  This could explain
the apparent low cost of the inflation reduction policy. But the process has
not been easy.
A comparison between actual inflation and the inflation target is presented
in Table 1 and in Figure 1. In the same Figure, we also present an estimate of
expected inflation obtained by comparing ex-ante values of the nominal and
real interest rates of comparable liabilities for commercial banks.





1994   8.90% 10.00%
1995   8.20%   9.00%
1996   6.60%   6.50%
1997   6.00%   5.50%
We will now analyze the process of inflation reduction. We will examine
the hypothesis that the main channels through which the new strategy operated
were: (1) changing the process of the formation of expectations regarding
future inflation; (2) generating a trajectory of real exchange rate appreciation
as a side effect of the combination of monetary and fiscal policies; and (3)
slowing down the rate of growth of the unit cost of labor as a result of the
effect of the  economic reforms on average labor productivity.  The first
channel concerns the issue of whether the increasing credibility of the Central
Bank inflation target modified the process of the formation of inflation
expectations.  If this is the case, those expectations affect the dynamics of
wages directly, and the dynamics of the inflationary process indirectly. The











1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year
Expectations Target Total Inflation
Figure  1. Actual, Expected and Target Inflation
second channel, the appreciation of the real exchange rate, works through
the effects of the trajectory of the nominal exchange rate on the price dynamics
of tradable goods and ultimately on inflation. Finally the third channel, the
increase in average labor productivity, reduces the unit cost of labor and it
produces its effects through the price of non-tradables.
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Before proceeding to study the dynamics of Chilean inflation, we will
examine its behavior during the last ten years.  Figure 2 presents the evolution
of the quarterly core inflation rate, expressed at an annual rate, from the first











This figure shows that annualized core inflation peaked in the last quarter
of 1990, when it reached an annual rate of 32.9%. It has declined continuously
since then, reaching an annual rate of only 1.7 % in the last quarter of 1997.
Inflation dynamics can be studied using a simple structure, as was done
in Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) and Burton and Fischer (1997). They define
the inflation rate as the weighted average of the rate of change in the prices
of tradable and non-tradable goods and services.  Then, to complete that
simple structure, they assume that the rate of change in the price of non-
tradable goods is given by the rate of change of wages. The rate of change in
Figure 2. Core Inflation: 1986.1 to 1997.4
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the price of tradable goods is given by the sum of the rate of change of
external prices and the rate of change in the exchange rate. In our case, we
start with this simple model, but we define the price of non-tradable goods
as the rate of change in the unit cost of labor.
That is, we start from the following model:7
pS
t  = a (wt - qt)+ (1-a) (p*t + et)
where pS is core inflation, w is the rate of change of wages, q is the rate of
change of average labor productivity, p* is world inflation and e is the rate
of depreciation of the local currency.
Adding and subtracting pS
t –1, we obtain:
pS
t  = pS
t –1 + a (wt – qt –pS
t –1)+ (1-a) (p*t + et –pS
t –1);
From the above expression, it can be observed that inflation can be reduced
when the rate of change of the unit cost of labor is below the inflation rate of
the  previous period and when the rate of change in the price of tradables
(p*t + et ) is below inflation for the last period.
Downward pressure on the first term,  (wt – qt – pS
t –1), was exercised by
the effect of the increasing credibility of stabilization policy on the trajectory
of wt,   by the effect of the gradual reduction of inflation on the behavior of
nominal wages, and by the positive effect of structural reforms on average
labor productivity.
Now we examine the second term, which can also be written as:
(p*t + et – pS
t ) + (pS
t – pS
t–1 )
The first term is the rate of change of the real exchange rate and the
7 The variables are expressed as quarterly rates of change.
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second term is  the first difference in the inflation rate. The first term is
negative when the real exchange rate appreciates and the second term is
negative when macroeconomic policies are oriented toward achieving a
gradual reduction of inflation. It is clear that this term is negative as long as
the real exchange rate appreciates or core inflation is being gradually reduced.
In  Figure  3,  we  plot  the  three  terms  that  appear  on  the  right  hand
side  of  the   inflation  equation.  We  label  the  term  T1=  (wt – qt – pS
t –1),
T2 = (p*t + et –pS
t), and  T3= (pS
t– pS
t-1).  From observing the figure, it is clear
that, since1994, both T1 and T2 made important contributions to the reduction
of inflation.
Figure  3. The Sources of Inflation
8 This estimate of a is obtained from a simple regression of the price equation, as
given.
Using this model and a value of a = 0.59, we obtain an inflation estimate8.
In figure 4, we plot actual core inflation and the core inflation estimated
through the simple model presented above.
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Figure 4. Actual Core Inflation and Estimated Core Inflation
(Simple Model)
We will now estimate a model of inflation by extending the simple model
presented above. The main extensions are the introduction of structural
equations to describe the dynamic of core inflation, wages and the nominal
exchange rate. The literature on the modeling of inflation in Chile is
extensive9.  We will concentrate on the open economy type models studied
during the last fifteen years.  Corbo (1985b) built a model of Chilean inflation
to study inflation dynamics up to the early 1980s, using a reduced form of
the Salter-Swan-Dornbusch dependent economy model.  Corbo and Solimano
(1991) investigated the dynamics of Chilean inflation up to the late 1980s,
using a small structural model.  Edwards (1993) examined the question of
Chilean inflation dynamics and inertia in the context of the use of the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor for the 1974 to 1982 period.  He also
9 For earlier models of the Chilean inflation, see Harberger (1963) and Corbo (1974).
For a review of inflation models for countries with moderate inflation, see Dornbusch
and Fischer (1993).
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used a reduced form of the Salter-Swan-Dornbusch dependent economy
model.  In the reduced form of his model, inflation is a function of lagged
inflation (which comes from the wage and exchange rate equations of his
structural model), foreign inflation, and the rate of change in domestic credit.
He also introduced a dummy variable, which takes the value of one during
the fixed exchange rate period and zero otherwise.  The dummy variable
interacts with the coefficient of the lagged inflation variable to allow for
inertia reduction following the fixing of the exchange rate.  The results of
his estimation led Edwards to conclude that the dynamic of inflation displayed
considerable inertia during this period.
Corbo and Fischer (1994), using monthly data for the 1974.2 to 1982.1
period,  estimated a small structural model similar to that used in Bruno
(1978), Corbo (1985b), Bruno (1991) and Corbo and Nam (1992). In their
solution from the structural model, they found that, during the 1980s, there
was substantial inertia.  Finally, Corbo and Piedrabuena (1995) estimated a
structural version of the dependent economy model with quarterly data for the
1983.I to 1994.I period.
We are interested in accounting for the reduction of Chilean inflation in
the 1990s.  For this purpose, we need a model which will also be able to
distinguish the contribution made by the three factors individualized above
to the reduction of inflation. The model that we use is similar to the one used
by Corbo and Fischer (1994), Edwards (1993) and Edwards (1996), in the
following form:10
 pS
 t  = a0 + a1 wt +a2 et + a3 p*t + a4 qt + a5 GAPt-2 (1)
wt  = b0 + b1 pE
t-1  + b2 pt-2  + b3 1/U t + b4 qt (2)
et   = g0 + g1 p*t-1  + g2 pt-1 + g3 DRINt + g4 It-1 + g5 PERt + g6 PERt-1 (3)
10 The variables are measured as rate of change with respect to the previous quarter.
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Where
p S = Core Inflation. (Consumer price index, excluding perishables and
oil products).
p = Actual  Inflation (Overall consumer price index).
pE = Expected Inflation.
w = Rate of Change of the Average Wage Rate.
p* = External Inflation in Dollars.
e = Rate of Change of the Exchange Rate, in Pesos per dollar.
q = Rate of Change of Average Labor Productivity.
GAP = Log of (GDP/Potential GDP).
DRIN = Change in Foreign Reserves, in US dollars.
I = Quarterly Change in GDP.
PER = Percentile within the band where the exchange rate in that quarter
is located.
Equation (1) is the price equation for core inflation and is obtained as the
weighted average of the price equations for tradable and non-tradable goods
and services. Equation (2) is the wage equation where lag inflation enters
through explicit indexation schemes in wage payments and expected inflation
enters through the adjustment of wages in contracts that are forward-looking.
Equation (3) describes the evolution of the nominal exchange rate within the
band. Before estimating the equations, it was necessary to study the time series
characteristics of the variables to avoid the possibility of estimating spurious
relations. For this purpose, we study the order of integration of the variables
that enter in the model11. The results of the test indicate that some variables are
I(0) and others are I(1), and therefore we cannot estimate the regressions
directly and need to determine first if the variables are cointegrated. We use
the Johansen procedure to test for cointegration of the variables; the results are
presented in the appendix. We proceed one equation at a time. From the
11 The results of the test for the order of integration of the variables are presented in the
appendix.
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cointegration study, we conclude that the three structural equations
cointegrate. As the structural equations have endogenous variables in the right
hand side, we estimate those variables using the Stock and Watson (1993)
methodology which corrects the estimates of standard errors of the coefficients
to correct for the simultaneous equation problem.
We will now proceed to analyze the results for the estimations of the
equations.
3.1 The Price Equation
The price equation is given by:
pS
 t  = a0 + a1 wt +a2 et + a3 p*t + a4 qt + a5 GAPt-2 + (1)
             + a6 D874881 + a7 D9123
Where D874881 and D9123 are dummies that take a value of one for
periods in which there was a change in the tax law.





























Period of Estimation 1987:3 a 1996:4
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In the price equation, the external inflation rate and the rate of change of
the exchange rate should have the same coefficient, as the relevant variable
in the equation for the price of tradables is the external rate of inflation
expressed in local currency.  However, the effects of the rate of change of the
exchange rate could also enter through expectations. Therefore, we do not
impose the restriction a3  = a4 + a5  but rather test for it by using a Wald test.
The result of the Wald test indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected with
a probability of 0.0423 (the p-value associated to the c2).
We proceed further and test for homogeneity of degree one of the price
equation in all the nominal variables. For this purpose, we test the null
hypothesis that, in an equation where foreign inflation and the rate of change
of the exchange rate enters with the same coefficient, the following restriction
should be fulfilled: a1+ a2+ a3= 1. The Wald test in this case has a p-probability
of 0.6615 and therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The results














Period 1987:3 a 1996:4
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12 It should be mentioned that we are not adjusting for inflation risk, as the difference
between the nominal and the real return for a deposit of the same maturity also includes
an inflation premium. Our procedure implicitly assumes that this inflation premium is
a constant which enters through the constant term of the regression.
This regression is the price equation that we use in the rest of the model
for the simulation experiments.
3.2 The Wage Equation
In Chile, there is a long history of wage indexation, up to 1982 by law
and since then as part of the normal process of collective bargaining in an
economy with long experience of high and variable inflation. Therefore, we
specify a wage equation in which wages respond to lag inflation, expected
inflation, the rate of growth of average labor productivity and quarterly
dummies. The initial wage equation is given by:
wt  = b0 + b1 pE
t-1  + b2 pt-2  + b3 1/U t + b4 qt + b5 D1 + b6 D2 + b7 D3  (2)
Where D1, D2 and D3 are dummies for first and second quarter.
Before estimating this equation, we must first discuss the measurement
of inflation expectations. Fortunately, in Chile we have time deposits offered
in nominal and real terms. Thus, we use a market reading of inflation
expectations by comparing the interest rate of nominal and indexed 90 to
365 days deposits in the banking system, both expressed at an annual rate12
.

















Period of Estimation 1986:2 a 1997:4
In this equation, we observe that some of the coefficients are not
statistically significant. We now proceed to test for homogeneity of degree
one on the  inflation variable which appears on the right hand side. The
result of the Wald test for the null hypothesis that b1 = 1 indicates that the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected with a probability of 0.9122 (the p-value
associated to the c2 )  leading us not to reject the restriction.  The estimates









Period 1986:1 a 1997:4
3.3 Exchange Rate Equation
We will now analyze the trajectory of the rate of change in the nominal
exchange rate. As discussed above, the exchange rate is restricted by a
diagonal exchange rate band with a width of 5 percent in both directions of
central parity up to January 1992, 10 percent up to January 1997, and 12.5
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percent for the rest of the sample period.  Also, as of July 1992, central parity
was set in terms of a currency basket instead of the US dollar. Then, in
November 1994, and again in January 1997, the currency composition of the
basket was changed. All along, Central Bank authorities were struggling to
leave room for the real appreciation required by their restrictive monetary
policy.
The general equation from which we start is of a type similar to the one
studied by Magendzo, Rojas y Vergara (1996). In this specification, the rate
of nominal depreciation is given by the following equation:
et = g0 + g1p*t-1 + g2pt-1+ g3DRINt + g4It-1 + g5PERt + g6PERt-1
Where PER is the percentile of the exchange rate band within which the
exchange rate is located.























                         R2                    0.659813
Adjusted R2 0.5350
DW 2.02
Period 1987:2 a 1997:3
13 The low R2 is an old fact in exchange rate equations. For Chile, see Cowan and De
Gregorio (1996) where the estimated equations explain between 52 and 59 per cent,
for monthly observations between 1990 and 1996.
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We have completed the estimation of the structural model of inflation,
but before carrying out the simulations of alternative policies, we need to
endogenize the formation of expectations.
3.4 Completing the Model
To model inflation expectations, we allow for two different regimes. For
the 1986.1 to 1991.4 period, we assume that inflation expectations are a
function of a moving average of inflation during the four previous quarters.
For the period after 1991, when the Central Bank pursued an inflation target
policy, we make inflation expectations a function of the inflation target and
the past difference between the inflation target and the actual inflation rate.
The latter variable represents the effect of the degree of fulfillment of the
target on expectations.
The estimation of the equations for expected inflation yields the following
results:
Equation for the 1986.1 to 1991.4 period:
pe
t = j0 + j1((pt + pt-1 + pt-2 + pt-3)/4)







Period 1987:4 a 1991:4
One would expect the coefficient of the moving average of inflation in
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this equation to have a value of one.  When we test this hypothesis using a
Wald test, the p-value of the probability of a type-one error is 0,7296.
Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. We impose this restriction







Period 1987:4 a 1991:4
The model for the second period (when the Central Bank pursued an
inflation target) is given by:
pe
t = c0 + cTARt+4 + c2(((pt-1 + pt-2 + pt-3 + pt-4)/4) - pe
t -5)
Where TAR is the inflation target of the Central Bank converted from an
annual to a quarterly base.








Period 1992:1 a 1997:4
144REACHING ONE-DIGIT INFLATION: THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE
We then test to determine if the coefficient of TARt+4 is equal to one. The
Wald test for this null hypothesis yields a p-value of 0.945, leading us to not
reject the null hypothesis. This finding suggests that, during this period, the
inflation target did play a key role as the anchor for the expected rate of
inflation.








Period 1992:1 a 1997:1
3.5 Simulating the Effect of Policy on Inflation
Now we will carry out three experiments. First, we will simulate the effect
of the inflation target announced by the independent Central Bank on inflation
expectations and, then, the effects of this factor on the observed trajectory
of inflation. (Simulation 1). Second, we will simulate the trajectory of the
inflation rate as though the exchange rate policy had been a crawling peg
which accommodated real appreciation of 2 percent per annum (Simulation
2). Third, we will simulate the rate of inflation for the case in which the
average rate of productivity for the period 1991-1997 is set equal to its value
for the 1970-1990 period. Finally, we simulate the cumulative effect of both
changes taken together (Simulation 3).
To facilitate the discussion, we present, first, the full model used for the
simulations.
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pS
 t  = a0 + a1 wt + a2 et + a3 p*t + a4 qt + a5 GAPt-2+ (1)
               + a6 D874881 + a7 D9123
wt  = b0 + b1 pE
t-1  + b2 D1 (2)
et = g0 + g1pe
t-1 + g2pt-1 + g3DRIN + g4It-1 + g5vt + g6vt-1 (3)
pe
t= j0 + j1((pt + pt-1 + pt-2 + pt-3)/4) (4)
      for the period 1986.1 to 1991.4
pe
t = c0 + cTARt+4+ c2(((pt-1 + pt-2 + pt-3 + pt-4)/4) - pe
t -5) (5)




Before analyzing the simulations, we solve the complete model for the
1992.1 to 1997.4 period to obtain a benchmark. Those solved values from
the model will be used to analyze the effects of the different simulations
studied below.
As shown below, the comparison of the actual and simulated values for
core inflation, on an annual basis, is very favorable to the model. The
exception is 1997, when the inflation reduction was much greater than that
estimated by the model.
14 This equality is utilized in the simulations to take into account the effect of a change
in the observed rate of inflation.
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year
Core Inflation Model Solution
Inflation and Model Solution
Simulation 1: The Effect of the Inflation Target on Inflation Reduction
To carry out this simulation, we start by building a counter-factual where
the expectations of inflation during the second period are driven by the same
equation which accounts for them during the first period. That is, we assume
that, during the second period, inflation expectations were explained by
equation (4) above. As a summary, we compare the simulated trajectory of a
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situation in which expectations had continued to be based on past inflation with
the model solution which uses equation (5) for the 1992.1 to 1997.4 period.
On an annual basis, the difference between the actual and the estimated
core inflation yielded the following trajectory:
Simulation 1. The Effect of the Introduction of an
Inflation Target on Inflation Expectations







From the results presented in this table, we can observe that the change
in the formation of expectations played a central role in the reduction of
inflation throughout the period.
The difference in the trajectory of core inflation on a quarterly basis is
presented in the following diagram:
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Simulation 2: The effect of the Exchange Rate Trajectory.
In this simulation, with inflation expectations still modeled by equation
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Year
Observed Real Exchange Rate Balassa-Samuelson Real Exchange Rate
Simulation 1
Real Exchange Rate
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rate rule, we assume that the real exchange rate appreciates 2% per annum
to accommodate for the effect of the Samuelson-Balassa effect on the
equilibrium real exchange rate.  The comparison of the trajectory of the
observed and simulated real exchange rate presented below indicates that
the real exchange rate appreciated quite substantially in the latter part of the
sample period.
In our model, the appreciation above the two percent per annum rate
helped to reduce inflation. Of course, it could be claimed that the equilibrium
real exchange rate appreciated much more than what is assumed by our 2%
per annum rule. The larger appreciation could be explained by other real
factors.  However, the sharp reduction in the growth of export volumes in
recent years provides some evidence that the real appreciation was excessive.
 On an annual basis, the difference between the base core inflation and
the inflation rate simulated with the assumed real exchange rate rule is
presented below:
Simulation 2.  The Effect of Real Appreciation Greater
than 2% per Annum







Thus, we observe that, if the real exchange rate had appreciated 2% per
annum, then inflation would had been reduced much more slowly during the
entire period. Furthermore, the difference between the model and simulated
solutions is especially large in 1997, the year when real appreciation was
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greatest. Thus, the sharp real appreciation of 1997 played a central role in
the reduction of inflation that year.
As can be observed from the simulation results, the effect of the real
exchange rate appreciation above 2 percent per annum has been an important
contributor to the reduction of inflation during the last two years.
Simulation 3. The Effect of Increased Average Labor Productivity on
the Reduction of Inflation
In this simulation, we assume that, during the 1992.1 to 1997.4 period,
the rate of change of average labor productivity was, on average, equal to
1.96% per annum, a rate which is equal to the average rate of productivity
growth during the 1960-1980 period. The results of the simulation are
presented below.  As can be observed, this effect explains a reduction of
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Simulation 2
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Model Solution Simulation 3
Simulation 3
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Simulation 4.  The Effect of the Credibility of the Inflation Target,  of the
Appreciation of the Real Exchange Rate, and of Increased Productivity
on the Reduction of Inflation.
In this simulation, we combine the effects of the three simulations. The
difference in trajectory is as follows:REACHING ONE-DIGIT INFLATION: THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE







The analysis of the cumulative effect of the three simulations shows that,
if it were not for the change in the formation of inflation expectations, for
the appreciation of the real exchange rate above two percent per annum, and
for increased labor productivity over its average value for the 1960-1980
period, the core inflation rate in 1998 would have been close to four times
its observed value.
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Year
Model Solution Simulation 4
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Summary of Results
Year Core Inflation Model Solution Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4
1992 12.10% 12.15% 16.49% 13.38% 12.49% 19.14%
1993 13.90% 12.51% 17.21% 13.67% 12.92% 22.97%
1994 10.39% 10.50% 14.66% 9.49% 10.91% 19.11%
1995 7.17% 7.80% 11.95% 7.04% 8.19% 15.26%
1996 7.72% 7.68% 11.68% 9.30% 8.07% 18.53%
1997 3.70% 5.39% 8.91% 8.69% 5.77% 19.61%
IV. Conclusions
After 40 years of high and variable inflation, Chile has made major
progress during this decade in reducing inflation toward levels observed in
industrial countries. What is even more remarkable is that the reduction of
inflation was achieved without incurring short-term costs. While inflation
was reduced, growth increased and the unemployment rate reached its lowest
level in 30 years. Thus, Chile’s economic record over the past ten years has
been remarkable.  During the 1986-1997 period, the average GDP growth
rate reached 7.6%, while average inflation ran at a rate of 17.8%.  The
unemployment rate, which rose to close to 30% in late 1982, was only 5.3%
during the last quarter of 1997. Furthermore, the inflation rate (Dec.- Dec.),
which had risen to 27,3% in 1990, decreased throughout the 1990s, reaching
6.6% in 1996, and 6.0% in 1997.
It appears that three factors were important in helping to accomplish this
performance. First, the independent Central Bank and its tough action early
on to convey the message that it was ready to stand behind its core objective
(to reduce inflation) helped to shape inflationary expectations and, in the
process, led to lower wage inflation and, ultimately, a lower path for core
inflation.  Second, restrictive monetary policy and the foreign exchange
intervention policies associated with it resulted in a nominal exchange rate
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trajectory much below what would have been observed under a PPP rule
adjusted for differences in productivity. This result was reinforced by the
low credibility of the band, reflected in the effect on the observed exchange
rate of the location of the exchange rate within the band. Third, the higher
rate of growth of labor productivity, given the wage equation, resulted in a
lower rate of growth of the unit cost of labor than would have been observed
otherwise. Of these three effects, the first, that is, the enhanced credibility of
the new policy influencing the formation of inflation expectations, was the
most important contributing factor to the successful reduction of the rate of
inflation.
The question remains of how to continue reducing inflation, now that the
rate of growth of average labor productivity has stabilized and real exchange
rate appreciation has started to be reversed. The appropriate policy course
here is to try to consolidate the gains made until now and to wait for a more
favorable environment to continue making further progress to bring inflation
close to industrial country levels.
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Table A.1
Unit Root Tests for Inflation Variables
(1986: 1-1997:4)
Variable ADF Test 5% Critical Value D. of Integration
Core Inflation (pS)
No Intercept or Trend -0.98 -1.95 I(1)
External Inflation (p*)
No Intercept or Trend -2.26 -1.95 I(0)
Wages (w)
No Intercept or Trend -1.01 -1.95 I(1)
Exchange Rate (e)
No Intercept or Trend -1.79 -1.95 I(1)
Average Productivity (q)
No Intercept or Trend -1.14 -1.95 I(1)
Gap
Intercept and Trend -4.61 -3.51 I (0)
Appendix. Testing for the Order of Integration of the Variables
In this appendix, we apply, first, a standard test to evaluate the order of
integration of the different variables into the model used in the paper. Second,
we apply Johansen’s methodology to evaluate the cointegration of the
different equations into the model.
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15 In this case, the critical value is equal to the normal distribution, in accordance with
the methodology of Enders (1995). (See page 257).
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Unit Root Tests for Inflation Variables
(1986: 1-1997:4)
Variable ADF Test 5% Critical Value D. of Integration
Expected Inflation (pe)
Intercept and Trend15 -2.94 -1.95 I(0)
Change in International
Reserves (DR)
Intercept and Trend -4.44 -3.51 I(0)
Actual Inflation (p)
No Intercept or Trend -1.31 -1.95 I(1)
Exchange Rate
Percentile (PER)
No Intercept or Trend -1.51 -1.95 I(1)
GDP Growth (I)
No Intercept or Trend -0.67 -1.95 I(1)
Target Inflation (TAR)
Intercept and Trend -5.04 -1.96 I(0)JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS








Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
Series: pS
t wt  et  p*t   qt  GAPt-2
Lags interval: 1 to 3
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value      Critical Value No. of CE(s)
0.821099  160.3392  94.15 103.18 None **
0.558409  86.33961 68.52  76.07 At most 1 **
0.513258  51.19262 47.21  54.46 At most 2 *
0.266204  20.23169 29.68 35.65 At most 3
0.136295  6.922142 15.41 20.04 At most 4
0.014352  0.621612 3.76 6.65 At most 5
   *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
   L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
B. Wage Equation:
  Sample: 1985:1 1997:4
   Included observations: 48
   Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
   Series:  wt  pE
t
   Lags interval: 1 to 2
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s)
0.368648  23.38017  15.41  20.04  None **
0.026829  1.305373   3.76   6.65  At most 1
   *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
   L.R. test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level.REACHING ONE-DIGIT INFLATION: THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE
t
159
C. Exchange Rate Equation:
 Sample: 1985:1 1997:4
  Included observations: 42
  Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data
  Series: et  p*t pt  DRINt  It-1 PERt
  Lags interval: 1 to 1
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s)
0.888234  186.8818  94.15 103.18 None **
0.675063  94.84515  68.52  76.07 At most 1 **
0.459506  47.63198  47.21  54.46 At most 2 *
0.260943  21.79056  29.68  35.65 At most 3
0.131384  9.090607  15.41  20.04 At most 4
0.072803  3.174738   3.76   6.65 At most 5
    *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
   L.R. test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level
D. Expectations Equations (1986 to 1991)
 Sample: 1985:1 1991:4
  Included observations: 17
  Test assumption: Linear deterministic trend in the data









  Lags interval: 1 to 2
Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesized
Eigenvalue Ratio Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s)
0.870730 40.22884  15.41 20.04 None **
0.274249  5.449316 3.76 6.65 At most 1 *
   *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level
   L.R. test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance levelJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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